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I. INTRODUCTION
The pursuit of individual or group economic self-interest is a
primary motivation for seeking governmental action, whether in
the context of lobbying for the enactment of a statute, seeking an
administrative ruling, or engaging in litigation. Often the govern-
mental action sought would be harmful to the petitioners' com-
petitors, foreign or domestic, or would have a negative impact on
the process of competition. If not for the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine,' competitors seeking anticompetitive governmental action
frequently might be inhibited by the risk of liability under section
1 of the Sherman Act,2 which prohibits any agreement between
competitors where the purpose or effect of the agreement is to
create an "unreasonable" restraint of trade.3 Solicitation of an-
* A.B., Princeton University (1968); J.D. Columbia Law School (1975).
See text accompanying notes 65-95 infra. The doctrine takes its name from Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and UMW v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
' Section 1 provides in pertinent part that "every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... " According to case law, not all
agreements in restraint of trade are illegal, but only those that are "unreasonable." See
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). An "unreasonable"
agreement is one that is, on balance, more anticompetitive than procompetitive; as the
courts see it, Congress has not delegated to the judiciary the power to weigh the benefits of
competition versus other social desiderata, but rather has expressed an intent that every
agreement the net effect of which is anticompetitive is to be held unlawful. See National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-96 (1978).
Certain practices (known as "per se" section 1 violations), such as price-fixing
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ticompetitive governmental action also potentially conflicts with
other antitrust statutes.'
Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, lobbying, publicity cam-
paigns seeking governmental activities, and other governmental
contacts, such as participation in judicial or administrative pro-
ceedings, are immune from antitrust liability unless such conduct
is otherwise unlawful (e.g., bribery) or a "sham" in that its real
purpose is not to seek governmental action but rather to cause
some direct restraint on a competitor.' The United States
Supreme Court has not clarified whether Noerr-Pennington is
based on the principle that the first amendment must prevail in
any conflict with the Sherman Act or on an absence of a general
congressional intent to regulate political activity and other con-
tacts with government by means of the Sherman Act.' The lower
courts are divided on this question,7 which in any event does not
affect the outcome of the typical case presenting a Noerr-
Pennington issue.
Although a long line of cases establishes that the Sherman Act
may apply to anticompetitive conduct outside the United States
having a substantial effect on United States commerce,8 the
agreements and division of markets, are held to be so anticompetitive that no particularized
inquiry into their purpose and effect is necessary; they are automatically deemed to be
unreasonable restraints of trade. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
Joint solicitation of anticompetitive governmental activity has never been held to be a per
se antitrust violation, but such activity may be unlawful under the rule of reason to the ex-
tent that it is not within the scope of Noerr-Pennington protection.
' Individual petitioning for anticompetitive governmental actions may, to the extent
that such activity is outside Noerr-Pennington, constitute monopolization or an attempt to
monopolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Cf. City of Mishawaka
v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981)
(filing of electric rates with regulatory agencies may be part of a cost-price squeeze
violative of section 2). In addition, individual or group petitioning could run afoul of section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
1 See text accompanying notes 81, 88 infra. It is fairly well-established in lower court
opinions that Noerr-Pennington immunity does not extend to the solicitation of governmen-
tal actions of a commercial nature. E.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); General Aircraft Corp.
v. Air America, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1979).
6 See text accompanying notes 65-88 infra.
' Compare International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d
1255, 1267 n.14 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1981)(activities within scope of
right to petition are not covered by the Sherman Act), with In re Airport Car Rental An-
titrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 1979)(Noerr-Pennington is based on a
first amendment exception to the antitrust laws).
' See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland
Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 1 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965
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Supreme Court has not determined whether the extraterritorial
effect of Noerr-Pennington immunity is congruent with the ex-
traterritorial application of the Sherman Act.' As the court noted
in Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc.,
"[ilt is an open question whether . . . [the Noerr-Pennington] doc-
trine, which protects legitimate attempts to petition the United
States government, has any application to the lobbying of foreign
governments."'" Similarly, Donald Baker, referring to the position
taken on this question in the Antitrust Guide for International
Operations issued by the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice in 1977,1 stated that "[w]hat emerged as the most con-
troversial issue in the Guide, at least in the discussion in the
public press, was the Department's position that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine applied to petitions to foreign
governments."'2
In the only lower court case directly on point, Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.,'3 the court held that
Noerr-Pennington did not immunize defendant's inducing of a Per-
sian Gulf sheikhdom to make a territorial claim for two reasons:
(1) the "constitutional freedom 'to petition the Government' car-
ries limited if indeed any applicability to the petitioning of foreign
governments,"'4 and (2) the representative-government rationale
underlying Noerr is inapplicable because the "persuasion of Mid-
dle Eastern states alleged in the present case is a far cry from the
political process with which Noerr was concerned."' 5
Many commentators agree that the rationale of the domestic
Noerr-Pennington doctrine has no application to the petitioning of
Trade Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The Timberlane-Mannington doctrine, the latest evolu-
tion in this line of cases, is discussed at text accompanying notes 30-52 infra.
See text accompanying notes 97-114 infra.
473 F. Supp. 680, 690 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Opera-
tions, Case N (Jan. 26, 1977), reprinted in 799 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at E-1,
E-17-18 (Feb. 1, 1977)(hereinafter cited as International Antitrust Guide). See also Justice
Throws Cold Water on Japanese Color TV Investigation
, 
807 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) at A-24-25 (March 29, 1977).
" Baker, Critique of the Antitrust Guide: A Rejoinder, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 255, 260
(1978)(citations omitted). See also 1978 Proceedings of the Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law at 99
(remarks by Eleanor Fox); id. at 115 (remarks by Douglas Rosenthal)(noting the unsettled
status of the question discussed in this article).
3 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
331 F. Supp. at 108.
Id. The court held, however, that defendant did enjoy immunity under the act-of-state
doctrine, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on this ground.
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foreign governments. For example, Graziano states flatly that
"[p]olitical activity undertaken outside the United States and
directed at foreign governments is not constitutionally
protected."16 Likewise, in his recent treatise on international anti-
trust law, Professor Hawk states:
The limited statutory construction of the Sherman Act an-
nounced in Noerr-Pennington rests on related policy considera-
tions: the constitutional rights to petition and association, and a
desire not to inhibit the free flow of information and opinions
from constituents to their elected representatives and decision-
makers. It is highly questionable whether these policies support
the extension of Noerr-Pennington to procurement of foreign
government action. 7
Other commentators share this opinion."
Reasoning on the basis of this limited view of the first amend-
ment, some commentators conclude that there is no protection
whatever for solicitation of foreign-government action otherwise
in violation of United States antitrust law. Fischel states:
If the Noerr-Pennington doctrine were based on statutory
construction of the Sherman Act, the decision in Occidental
Petroleum would be hard to justify; it would be difficult to
argue that Congress intended attempts to influence our govern-
ment to be exempt but not similar attempts to influence a
foreign government. But once it is recognized that Noerr rests
on the first amendment right to petition, the reasoning of Oc-
cidental Petroleum seems persuasive. Since there is no first
amendment right to petition a foreign government, attempts to
influence such governments should not be protected by the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 9
Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust
Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 132 (1967).
11 B. HAWK, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE
145-46 (1979).
" Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis
and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80, 120-21 (1977); Fugate,
The Department of Justice's Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 17 VA. J. INT'L
L. 645, 693 (1977); McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: An Antitrust Ap-
proach, 86 YALE L.J. 215, 240 (1976); Note, Corporate Lobbyists Abroad- The Extrater-
ritorial Application of Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1254,
1275-77 (1973)[hereinafter cited as Corporate Lobbyists Abroad]; Note, Immunities to Ex-
traterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 487, 500 n.27
(1978)[hereinafter cited as Immunities].
'" Fischel, supra note 18, at 120-21. To like effect is Immunities, supra note 18, at 500
n.27.
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Others contend that considerations not germane to the domestic
Noerr-Pennington cases, such as international comity and related
concerns20 as well as the legitimate interests of private parties do-
ing business in other countries, 21 support the extraterritorial ex-
tension of Noerr-Pennington. Although in the past Professor
Areeda has taken the intermediate position that Noerr-
Pennington applies only to solicitation of democratic govern-
ments,' he evidently has abandoned the view that a distinction
between democratic and nondemocratic governments should be
made in this context.'
This article contends that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
should be extended to cover solicitation of foreign governments.
This conclusion is premised not only on considerations of comity2'
and the need to protect legitimate private interests, 5 but also on
the argument that failure to extend Noerr-Pennington is likely to
lead to effective and serious retaliation.' Furthermore, such
failure arguably would be contrary to -the rule of international
law, embodied in section 18(b)(iv) of the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, that jurisdiction
based on the objective territorial principle may not be asserted
where the rule of law being enforced is "inconsistent with the
principles of justice generally recognized by states that have
reasonably developed legal systems."'
Moreover, just as Congress evidently did not intend the an-
titrust laws to apply to ordinary and legitimate political activity in
the United States, there is little basis for a finding of congres-
sional intent that the antitrust laws should be applied to ordinary
and legitimate foreign political activity. Finally, although the
question is a difficult one, there is good reason to believe that the
first amendment protects the right to petition foreign govern-
ments.'
20 p. AREEDA & B. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 239, at 275 (1978)[hereinafter cited as as
Areeda & Turner]; Graziano, supra note 16, at 132; Corporate Lobbyists Abroad, supra
note 18, at 1277-78.
" B. HAWK, supra note 17, at 148; Corporate Lobbyists Abroad, supra note 18, at
1278-79.
P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 1 187 n.206 (1967).
1 Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 275, recognizes a general "privilege" possessed
by all governments to regulate their political processes.
See text accompanying notes 163-179 infra.
See text accompanying notes 210-211 infra.
See text accompanying notes 192-209 infra.
See text accompanying notes 180-191 infra.
See text accompanying notes 216-251 infra.
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II. THE RELATION BETWEEN NOERR-PENNINGTON AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST DOCTRINES
Whether Noerr-Pennington protects contacts with foreign
governments is an important question in light of increasing inter-
national economic interdependence as well as the broad extrater-
ritorial sweep of the Sherman Act and the simultaneous uncer-
tainty as to precisely when and how the antitrust laws will be ap-
plied to conduct occurring outside the United States. Under re-
cent authorities, the Sherman Act may apply not only to com-
modities trade in worldwide markets and to anticompetitive acts
directly affecting United States imports, but also to local business
activity in foreign countries where the effect on United States
commerce is only incidental and is demonstrably less than the ef-
fect on the local economy."
The law on extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act has
undergone significant development recently as a result of two
cases: Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A.30
in the Ninth Circuit, and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp.," a Third Circuit decision heavily influenced by the opinion
in Timberlane. These cases, which lay down a "jurisdictional rule
of reason" as to the circumstances in which to accept or decline
jurisdiction over Sherman Act claims involving foreign conduct
substantially affecting United States commerce, establish a com-
plex, multipart balancing test to be applied by the district court.
Even without extraterritorial application of Noerr-Pennington,
the Timberlane-Mannington doctrine might provide some
measure of protection to the solicitation of foreign governments,
although that protection would be far more qualified and un-
" This point is illustrated rather dramatically by Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf &
Western Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), where the alleged monopolization of
tourist facilities in one portion of the Dominican Republic was held to state a claim for relief
under the Sherman Act. In furtherance of their anticompetitive plan, defendants allegedly
procured or attempted to procure various acts by the government of the Dominican
Republic. The court found that neither the Noerr-Pennington doctrine nor the act-of-state
doctrine provided a proper basis for summary judgment.
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
8 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). The Seventh Circuit, in its decision approving the entry of
default judgments against certain foreign uranium producers, indicated general approval of
Tim berlane-Mannington, but noted that the Alcoa effects test still governs with respect to
the power of a court to adjudicate the legality of extraterritorial activity. In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-55 (7th Cir. 1980).
The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has also indicated its approval of the
new "jurisdictional rule of reason." See 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,386 (remarks by the
Assistant Attorney General John Shenefield, Aug. 9, 1978).
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predictable in scope than the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In other
words, there are situations in which Tim berlane-Mannington
would produce the same result as application of Noerr-
Pennington, but in other situations the results might be different.
It is difficult to make accurate predictions and provide sound
counsel on the basis of Timberlane and Mannington. The issue is
whether antitrust jurisdiction over solicitation of foreign govern-
ments should be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account such factors as the nationality of the parties, the "con-
tacts" with the United States as compared with foreign
"contacts," and many other considerations, or whether as a
general matter one who legitimately solicits foreign governmental
action will be reasonably assured that his activities are shielded
from United States antitrust liability.
Timberlane involved an allegation that the defendants engaged
in a conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from milling lumber in
Honduras and exporting it to the United States. One of the means
by which the alleged conspiracy was perpetrated was the obtain-
ing of an order of attachment from a court in Honduras and the
appointment by the court of an intervenor (similar to a receiver)
who was employed by the defendants.32 Defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint and the district court granted the motion on
the basis of the act-of-state doctrine. Finding "no indication that
the actions of the Honduran Court and authorities reflected a
sovereign decision that Timberlane's efforts should be crippled or
that trade with the United States should be restrained,"' the
court of appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of a tripartite analysis consisting of
(1) a threshold showing of such actual or intended effect on
American commerce, a test deemed to be a prerequisite for sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the antitrust laws;' (2) "a greater
showing of burden or restraint" in a civil antitrust action;" and (3)
a multifactor balancing test looking to the interests of the United
" The Timberlane opinion did not discuss the issue whether Noerr-Pennington applied
to this solicitation of governmental action. Presumably the reason for this failure to discuss
Noerr-Pennington was that, in view of the allegations of misfeasance in connection with
defendants' obtaining of the court order, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine would offer no pro-
tection to defendants. See text accompanying notes 81, 88 infra.
" 549 F.2d at 608.
", Id. at 613.
a Id.
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States and the links with the United States as opposed to the
links with and the interests of other nations.
Although the issues in Mannington Mills were quite different
from those in Timberlane, the two cases are analogous for present
purposes. In Mannington Mills, the plaintiff argued that defen-
dant's foreign patents, although assumed arguendo to be valid
under applicable foreign law, were obtained by means constituting
a fraud on the Patent Office under United States patent law.37 In
addition, the plaintiff argued that case law holding that a
monopolization claim could be based on the obtaining of United
States patents by means constituting fraud under United States
law should be extended to allow such a claim founded on the ob-
taining of foreign patents. The court remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration of whether such a claim should be entertained,
with such consideration to be based on a country-by-country
analysis of ten factors, some taken from the Timberlane opinion
and some added by the Mannington court.'
To provide some insight into how communication with foreign
sovereigns would be treated in the absence of extraterritorial ap-
It Id at 613, 614. The court's analysis appears to have been strongly influenced by sec-
tion 40 of the Restatement (Second Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which it
cited. 549 F.2d at 614 n.31. Section 40 provides as follows:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and
the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a per-
son, each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith,
moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such fac-
tors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent en-
forcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed
by that state.
This section of the Restatement was, of course, not literally applicable to the case at bar, in
which there was no party who was subject to inconsistent requirements of law. The court
recognized, however, that any extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws
should occur only with due regard for the vital national interests of other countries and
other appropriate factors.
"7 Just as the Timberlane court declined to hold that the Honduran judicial decision was
an act-of-state, Mannington likewise found that the act of issuing patents does not amount
to an act-of-state. 595 F.2d at 1293-94.
" Once again the opinion fails to disclose any consideration of whether defendant's
solicitation of foreign governmental action was immunized by Noerr-Pennington. Again, as
in Timberlane, it would have been difficult for the defendant to argue that the methods of
solicitation that it allegedly employed were such as to afford Noerr-Pennington protection.
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plication of Noerr-Pennington, each of the ten Mannington fac-
tors 9 is analyzed below in the light of a few hypothetical cases.
"1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy."
Case 1. Defendants, high-cost producers of widgets in
France, become concerned about the inundation of the French
market by low-cost American widgets. They launch a publicity
campaign, the primary purpose of which is to secure protective
legislation. Defendants are successful in achieving this result.
Plaintiffs, American widget manufacturers, sue for treble
damages.
Timberkane-Mannington probably protects defendants from liabili-
ty, as Noerr-Pennington surely would.'0 The United States litiga-
tion impinges on France's public policy of protecting its home
market, a policy important enough for a statute to be enacted.
However, defendants' success is not certain, 1 because under
Timberlane-Mannington the court would be required to conduct a
wide-ranging examination of such matters as the relative impor-
tance of widget exports to America and of widget production to
France, the nationality of those who conducted the publicity cam-
paign, and the possibility that entertaining the litigation might
damage United States foreign relations.
Case 2. This hypothetical case involves the same facts as in
Case 1, except that defendants are not successful in persuading
the French government to take the action requested. Plaintiffs
sue for treble damages on the theory that the publicity cam-
paign disrupted and diminished their efforts in France in
various ways, one of which was that the campaign's reliance on
disputed scientific evidence convinced many French consumers
that American widgets cause cancer."2
A good argument can be made that Timberlane-Mannington
would protect defendants once again, as would Noerr-Pennington.
" 595 F.2d at 1297-98. It is not entirely clear whether the factors are listed in order of
importance, and it is certainly not clear from the Mannington opinion what relative weight
is to be accorded to the various factors.
"0 See text accompanying notes 66-75 infra.
" Defendants probably could place successful reliance also on the act-of-state doctrine.
But that doctrine might not be successful if defendants had sought not legislation but an ad-
ministrative interpretation of existing legislation. The act-of-state doctrine is discussed in
text accompanying notes 53-61 infra.
" Trade defamation and other business torts may, in certain circumstances, be held to
give rise to antitrust liability; the law in this area, however, is unsettled, and the extent to
which common law torts may be deemed to be antitrust violations is problematic. See
generally Yoerg, Should a Trade Secrets Misappropriation Claim Lie in the Procrustean
Antitrust Bed?, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1977).
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However, the outcome is more problematic. 3 France undoubtedly
has a public policy in favor of promoting open channels of com-
munication between the government and its citizens. The
American litigation would conflict with that policy, and hence it is
possible for a court to read Noerr-Pennington into the
Timberlane-Mannington doctrine and to hold that the foreign law
and public policy in favor of open channels of communication is so
strong that inquiry into the remaining nine factors will be dis-
pensed with.
Although there is much to command such a result, it is contrary
to the Timberlane and the Mannington Mills opinions, which
assume that even very important foreign public policies may be
outweighed by competing considerations. These opinions are
premised on the view that there are some circumstances so com-
pelling as to justify United States regulation of competitive condi-
tions in foreign countries, and if that is so then arguably there are
some circumstances so compelling that United States courts can
establish rules governing legitimate foreign political activity as
well.
"2. Nationality of the parties." Timberlane adds "allegiance,"
presumably referring to corporations, and also adds "the locations
or principal places of business of corporations,"" observing that
"whether the alleged offender is an American citizen .. .may
make a big difference. Applying American laws to American
citizens raises fewer problems than application to foreigners.""5
Case 3. A is a Delaware corporation whose stock is publicly
owned largely by United States citizens. B is a corporation in-
corporated in Peru. Its principal place of business is also in Peru
and most of its managers are Peruvians, but it is a wholly owned
subsidiary of an American multinational. C is incorporated in
Peru and all of its stock is owned by citizens of Peru. D and C
,a The act-of-state doctrine would not assist the defendants because in Case 2 no act of
state occurred.
" 549 F.2d at 614. Comment d to section 40 of the Restatement, states:
d. Nationality of corporations. The fact that the actor involved is a legal
rather than a natural person does not preclude consideration of nationality as a
factor in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction. To the extent that the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction relates to the conduct of persons controlling a corporation,
or who are its officers or agents, the nationality of such persons is also a factor to
be considered. Cf. § 27, Comment d.
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 40, comment d
(1969).
" 549 F.2d at 612.
[Vol. 11:3
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have each brought several patent and trademark infringement
actions against D in the courts of Peru and Bolivia. D sues in the
United States for damages under section 1, alleging that A, B,
and C cooperated with each other in instituting these meritless
proceedings to dissuade D from continuing to do business in
South America. Although the South American lawsuits have not
yet been adjudicated, D alleges that they lack merit. A, B, and C
move to dismiss.
Noerr-Pennington probably would protect the defendants, unless
it were shown that the foreign actions were based on claims
known to be lacking in merit under applicable law." But the
Timberlane and Mannington Mills opinions suggest that C's mo-
tion might succeed and A's might fail because (1) jurisdiction may
be exercised over A under the'relatively uncontroversial na-
tionality principle,'7 whereas jurisdiction over C must be based on
the quite controversial objective territorial principle," and (2) on a
more practical plane, foreigners are not so likely to be angry or
cause foreign relations difficulties if Americans are punished for
conduct abroad than if foreigners are punished.
The idea that A and C should be treated differently in this
hypothetical case does not, however, commend itself on grounds of
fairness. Moreover, it is doubtful whether, in this world of increas-
ing economic interdependence, it is wise to handicap United
States businesses operating abroad by making it more risky for
them to resort to litigation or other governmental approaches
than it is for their native competitors.
Finally, if A and C are to be treated differently, what is to be
done with B? Should it make a difference if sixty percent of B's
stock were owned by the American multinational and forty per-
cent by a citizen of Peru? What if ownership were split 50-50? At
what point does a corporation become "foreign" for purposes of
" A pattern of baseless litigation intended to discourage a competitor from exercising
its rights enjoys no Noerr-Pennington protection, California Motor Transp. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), and only one frivolous lawsuit may be enough on which to
predicate Sherman Act liability. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 434 U.S. 425 (1978).
But in general Noerr-Pennington protects a party's right to adjudicate his nonfrivolous
claims in a lawful manner, even if motivated by anticompetitive considerations. See
generally Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 39 (1980).
"7 Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 10(b)
(1969)[hereinafter cited as Restatement).
" Restatement, supra note 47, § 18(b). On the controversial nature of the American an-
titrust jurisdiction based on the objective territorial principle, see text accompanying notes
192-209 infra.
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the Timberlane-Mannington rule? Extraterritorial application of
Noerr-Pennington at least would reduce the significance of these
imponderable considerations, because the latter doctrine would
not take into account the nationality of the defendant.
"3. Relative importance of [sic, to] the alleged violation of con-
duct here compared to that abroad."
Case 4. E and F are United States multinational corpora-
tions. They decide jointly to petition an Italian administrative
agency to establish safety standards of arguable public benefit,
which their products can easily meet but their competitors find
difficult to satisfy. The decision is made by E's New York office
working together with F's Rome office. There are no personal
meetings on this subject. All communications are by letter or
telephone between Rome and New York.
Case 5. This hypothetical involves the same facts as case 4,
except that the idea of approaching the Italian agency has its
genesis at a meeting between two American vice-presidents of E
and F that takes place in New York.
Is there any reason why E and F should be treated differently
in case 3 or why case 3 should be treated differently than case 4?
The Tim berlane-Mannington doctrine indicates, however, that
these sorts of distinctions should be drawn, at least when
necessary to settle a close case.
"4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litiga-
tion there." Foreign states naturally are unlikely to provide a
remedy to those injured by solicitation of anticompetitive govern-
mental action. This fourth Mannington factor might be read to
suggest that the absence of a foreign remedy is an additional
reason for application of United States antitrust law to contacts
with foreign governments.
"5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce
and its foreseeability." Such intent and foreseeability are often
present, particularly when governmental action is sought on mat-
ters of major economic importance. For instance, certainly the
American steel and automobile manufacturers who are seeking
relief from imports intend to cause an effect on Japanese com-
merce.
Case 6. Zambia produces 85 percent of the world's zambite, a
rare and important mineral with many industrial uses. The
United States consumes 25 percent of world zambite production,
a fact well-known in Zambia. Zambian producers petition the
government to enforce a production cut of 50 percent, intending
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thereby to raise and stabilize world prices. The zambite in-
dustry employs one-quarter of the work force in Zambia and pro-
vides one-third of Zambia's foreign exchange.
Case 7. French truffle producers petition their government
to cut production by 50 percent, intending thereby to raise and
stabilize world prices. The dollar value of United States truffle
imports is 1000 times less than that of its zambite imports;
moreover, an increase in truffle prices causes little impact on
the prices of other foods, whereas a zambite price increase af-
fects many products. Truffle exports play a relatively small role
in the French economy.
The intent and foreseeability factors support the view that case
6 should be treated more harshly than case 7, where the
foreseeable impact on United States commerce is nil. But the first
Mannington factor, "degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,"
suggests precisely the opposite conclusion. Subjecting the zambite
producers to antitrust liability would cause a direct conflict with
one of Zambia's most vital public policies, and might create
serious foreign policy repercussions, considerations that suggest,
according to Mannington, that the United States courts should
tread very lightly.
Where solicitation of foreign governmental action is concerned,
do factors 1 and 5 simply cancel one another out, leaving the issue
of jurisdiction to be decided principally on the basis of the "na-
tionality of the parties"?
"6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises
jurisdiction and grants relief." This factor might suggest that
solicitation of governmental action in small and unimportant coun-
tries should be more readily subject to United States antitrust
jurisdiction than solicitation of action on the part of major foreign
powers.
"7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the
position of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country
or be under conflicting requirements by both countries." The
court had in mind the possibility of a conflict such as arose in the
British Nylon Spinners litigation, where a British company sued
in Britain for specife performance of a contract, the performance
of which a United States court had enjoined. 9 It has no application
to an action for damages or an injunction ordering the defendant
not to solicit foreign governments.
49 British Nylon Spinners v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch. 19 (C.A. 1952), made
permanent, [19551 ch. 37.
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"8. Whether the court can make its order effective." The com-
ments above with respect to the seventh factor apply here as well.
"9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this
country if made by the foreign nation under similar circum-
stances." It is not clear whether the Mannington court is address-
ing merely the question of the form of positive injunction that is
being requested, or whether the court is making the more inter-
esting observation that a kind of international "Golden Rule" is
appropriate. Congress has taken very serious exception to the ef-
forts on the part of certain foreign countries to tell American
businesses with whom they can and cannot do business.' There is
little doubt that we would react even more forcefully if foreign
governments attempted to regulate political activity in this country.
If the Mannington court is making the general suggestion that a
court, in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction, should put
itself in the position of the foreign country in question, then that
indicates once again a method by which Noerr-Pennington might
be read into Timberlane-Mannington, as a kind of special case of
the general principles laid down in the authorities on subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.
"10. Whether a treaty with these affected nations has addressed
the issue." This factor is likely to be of little or no significance in
the typical case presenting a Noerr-Pennington issue. Many
treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation guarantee non-
discriminatory treatment and equal access to the courts to the
citizens of both parties,51 but it is arguable whether such treaties
would be interpreted as modifying any of the principles of Sher-
man Act jurisprudence, including the Tim berlane-Mannington
doctrine.2
Cases involving the solicitation of foreign governments often
will involve a third doctrine in addition to Noerr-Pennington and
Timberlane-Mannington, namely the act-of-state doctrine. In cir-
cumstances where the act-of-state doctrine applies, it operates to
preclude the judiciary from entertaining a claim that necessarily
' See 26 U.S.C. § 999 and 50 U.S.C. App. § 2407 (relating to participation in interna-
tional boycotts).
" E.g., Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Between the United
States of America and Iran, on August 8, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899 T.I.A.S. 3853, 284 U.N.T.S. 93,
Article IM(2).
5 Treaties, like federal statutes, are the law of the land. Edye v. Robertson (Head
Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580 (1884). But implied repeals of antitrust law are disfavored. E.g.,
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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calls into question the validity of a foreign act of state. Although
not compelled by the doctrine of separation of powers, the prin-
cipal basis for the act-of-state doctrine is a concern that the
judicial branch should not interfere with the conduct of foreign af-
fairs by the executive branch or cause embarrassment to the
United States in the foreign policy area. 3
Like Noerr-Pennington, the act-of-state doctrine yields more
predictable results than the ten Mannington Mills factors.
Although the act-of-state doctrine operates to immunize some of
the same conduct within the scope of Noerr-Pennington protec-
tion, the act-of-state doctrine is much narrower than Noerr-
Pennington. For example, a party may not avail himself of the act-
of-state doctrine unless the validity' or motivation' of some
foreign act of state is called into question. Thus, the act-of-state
doctrine is inapplicable in the absence of an act of state. 51 It
follows that if a party tries unsuccessfully to persuade a foreign
government to take some action, no matter how legitimate his con-
duct, the act-of-state doctrine does him no good. Moreover, while
both Noerr-Pennington57 and act-of-state 5 probably are inap-
plicable to the solicitation of governmental activity of a commer-
cial nature, Noerr-Pennington potentially applies to all sovereign
acts. 9 By contrast, the act-of-state doctrine does not protect the
solicitation of sovereign acts not involving the establishment of
public policy. For example, the doctrine does not ordinarily pro-
tect litigation in foreign courts1° or the application for foreign
patents .61
In circumstances where the plaintiffs injury was not the direct
result of foreign governmental action but instead was caused by
the acts of private parties taken pursuant to a foreign governmen-
Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
, Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Oil and Gas Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
' Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); General
Aircraft Corp. v. Air America, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas. 1 62,452 (D.D.C. 1979); but see In-
dustrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 1979).
' See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
17 E.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 1979-2
Trade Cas., 62,746 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
Compare the plurality and dissenting opinions in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
9 See California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
So Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 608 (9th Cir.
1977).
" Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979).
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tal directive, the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion may ap-
ply.6" This doctrine appears to be merely a special case of the
common-law doctrine of duress; as such, it may have no applica-
tion if the coercive action was taken at the request of the party at-
tempting to set up the defense." By contrast, it is probably true
that in a domestic context the state-action doctrine provides an-
titrust immunity to private parties acting pursuant to a command
of the sovereign qua sovereign, even if the private party asserting
the defense solicited the state action."
In conclusion, it is clear that the scope of protection that would
be provided by extraterritorial application of Noerr-Pennington is
significantly different from that of other international antitrust
doctrines. The question whether to apply Noerr-Pennington to
solicitation of foreign governments is an issue of very con-
siderable practical significance as well as one of academic interest.
III. POLICY BASIS OF THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
Although the considerations relevant to whether Noerr-
Pennington should be applied extraterritorially may involve fac-
tors different from those underlying the application of the doc-
trine in a domestic context,"5 the starting point for analysis of ex-
traterritorial application is an examination of the policy basis of
Noerr-Pennington on the domestic front as articulated by the
Supreme Court.
In the first of this line of cases, Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.," the Supreme Court, in
a unanimous opinion written by Justice Black, held that a group of
railroads that had conducted a public relations campaign designed
to induce a state legislature to pass legislation harmful to their
competitors, the truckers, were not guilty of violating the Sher-
man Act, even assuming the truth of plaintiffs' allegations that (i)
defendants acted with malice, in that their purpose was to destroy
competition by legislative action, (ii) their ancillary purpose was to
harm the good will of the truckers by means of publicity, and (iii)
the campaign was characterized in some degree by fraud and un-
62 International Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979)(dic-
tum); but see Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958).
See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361-62 (1977).
See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra and notes 164-215 infra.
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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truth. 7 Noerr did, however, leave open a possible "sham excep-
tion" to its holding, indicating that liability might be found where
the primary purpose of ostensibly political activity is actually to
cause a direct restraint of trade by means other than government
action.68
In reaching its conclusion that "the Sherman Act does not apply
to the activities of the railroads at least insofar as those activities
comprised mere solicitation of government action with respect to
the passage and enforcement of laws," 9 the Court began by noting
that the Act has no application to a restraint of trade or
monopolization that is the result of valid governmental action. 0
The Court then went on to state: "We think it equally clear that
the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from
associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or
the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that
would produce a restraint or a monopoly."71 The Court thought it
highly significant that combinations for political action "bear very
little if any resemblance to the combinations normally held
violative of the Sherman Act . . ." such as price fixing, group
boycotts, and market-division agreements." However, this was
not the conclusive point. Rather, the Court held that the nonap-
' Id. at 138-44.
" Id. at 144.
Id. at 138.
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), and other authorities for this proposition are
based principally on considerations of federalism. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978). Since foreign states are not part of our federal
system, it does not necessarily follow from Parker and its progeny that foreign governmen-
tal restraints of trade are immune under the Sherman Act. However, there is authority
that foreign governments, like states of the union, may not be sued on the basis of govern-
mental restraints of trade. IAM v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
" 365 U.S. at 136. One writer has implied that this reasoning is fallacious: "It does not
necessarily follow from the fact that a particular governmental act is legal that every at-
tempt to procure that act is also legal." Corporate Lobbyists Abroad, supra note 18, at 1257
n.27. Justice Black did not say of course that every attempt to procure governmental action
is lawful. His point was simply that it would be incongruous to hold that the State of Penn-
sylvania has power to enact a given statute but that a group of private citizens may not
lawfully petition for the enactment of the statute.
", 365 U.S. at 136. It has been observed that this statement by the Court in Noerr rests
on the erroneous premise that "atypical, untraditional, anticompetitive agreements are not
violative of the antitrust laws .... " Fischel, supra note 18, at 83. Defendants' activities,
however, were by no means atypical and untraditional. On the contrary, the Court con-
sidered their behavior to be very traditional and typical political conduct.
What the Court saw as the "dissimilarity" between defendants' conduct and traditional
antitrust violations was the dissimilarity between directly interfering with free trade, on
the one hand, and seeking action by government, on the other hand. 365 U.S. at 136.
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plicability of the Sherman Act to defendants' activities was
decisively settled
when this factor of essential dissimilarity is considered along
with the other difficulties that would be presented by a holding
that the Sherman Act forbids associations for the purpose of in-
fluencing the passage or enforcement of laws.
In the first place, such a holding would substantially impair
the power of government to take actions through its legislature
and executive that operate to restrain trade. In a representative
democracy such as this, these branches of government act on
behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole con-
cept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to
make their wishes known to their representatives. To hold that
the government retains the power to act in this representative
capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that the people cannot
freely inform the government of their wishes would impute to
the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity,
but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis
whatever in the legislative history of that Act. Secondly, and of
at least equal significance, such a construction of the Sherman
Act would raise important constitutional questions. The right of
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights,
and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to
invade these freedoms. Indeed, such an imputation would be
particularly unjustified in this case in view of all the countervail-
ing considerations enumerated above. For these reasons, we
think it clear that the Sherman Act does not apply to the ac-
tivities of the railroads at least insofar as those activities com-
prised mere solicitation of governmental action with respect to
the passage and enforcement of laws.73
Although constitutional considerations were an ingredient in
the Noerr opinion, the Court specifically stated that it discerned
no conflict between the Sherman Act and the Constitution." In-
stead, its opinion was based on a construction of the antitrust laws
under which activities characterized as belonging to the "category
of political activity" fall outside the scope of the Act.75
In the second Supreme Court Noerr-Pennington case, United
Mine Workers of America v. Pennington," the question was
presented whether, as part of an alleged conspiracy between the
"' Id. at 137-38 (citations omitted).
" Id. at 132 n.6.
SId at 140-41.
1' 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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mine workers' union and large coal companies to drive small coal
companies out of business, liability could be predicated either (i)
on an approach to the Secretary of Labor to request that he act
pursuant to the Walsh-Healy Act 77 to establish a high minimum
wage in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) term contract coal
market, or (ii) on a request to the TVA to curtail its purchases in
the spot coal market. Answering both questions in the negative,
the Court announced the broad rule that "Noerr shields ... a con-
certed effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or
purpose.78 Although the Court's opinion in Pennington broke no
new ground in terms of elucidating the policy considerations
discussed in Noerr, it appeared to broaden the Noerr holding to
cover governmental procurement activities as well as solicitation
with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws.79
California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimiteds° involved an
alleged agreement among one group of highway carriers to in-
stitute state and federal proceedings, regardless of merit, to op-
pose the right of other carriers to operate, thereby effectively
barring meaningful access by the latter to agencies and courts.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Douglas and
representing the views of five Justices, firmly established that
Noerr-Pennington applies to contacts with judicial bodies and ad-
ministrative agencies as well as to contacts with the legislative
branch. The Court indicated, however, that conduct corrupting
the administrative or judicial process, such as that of the defen-
dants in the case under consideration, would not be immune from
antitrust liability.'
41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1976).
7 381 U.S. at 670.
7 However, later cases have undercut the implication in Pennington that commercial
dealings with governmental bodies enjoy antitrust immunity. See authorities cited in note 7
supra.
" 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
" The view that the holding in California Motor Transport should not be limited to the
precise facts in that case, which involved the bringing of baseless, repetitive claims with an
anticompetitive purpose, was adopted by the plurality and dissenting opinions, represen-
ting the views of a total of seven Justices, in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623
(1977). The opinions in Vendo seem to indicate a disinclination by the present Court either
to extend or cut back Noerr-Pennington immunity beyond the point indicated in Justice
Douglas' opinion in California Motor Transport.
One other Supreme Court opinion, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973), briefly addresses Noerr-Pennington. There the Court indicated that a district court's
dismissal of an antitrust claim based on defendant's bringing of repetitive actions intended
to harm its competition should be reconsidered in the light of California Motor Transport.
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The California Motor Transport Court stated that the opinion
in Noerr rested on two grounds: (i) the concept of representative
government, and (ii) the right of petition protected by the first
amendment.2 After noting that it had adhered to the same ap-
proach in Pennington, the court went on to observe:
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or
groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both
creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to
courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the right to
petition extends to all departments of the Government. The
right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right
of petition.
We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of associa-
tion and of petition to hold that groups with common interest
may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels
and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to ad-
vocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of
their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their com-
petitors.3
Justice Douglas' addition, in this passage, of freedom of associa-
tion to the considerations mentioned in Noerr should be read in
the context of other Supreme Court cases holding that freedom of
association is a fundamental right found in the penumbra of the
first amendment;" that it is intimately connected in its origin and
purpose with the first amendment rights of free speech and free
press;" and that it protects association for political ends' as well
as "forms of 'association' that are not political in the customary
sense but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the
members.""1
Despite its extension of the Noerr-Pennington rationale to in-
clude the right of association, and despite its extension of the
scope of Noerr-Pennington specifically to include contacts with all
branches of government, the Court held that defendants could not
invoke the broad rule of Pennington and the Noerr exemption for
unethical activities, in connection with a campaign to influence the
legislature, to shield their alleged attempt to bar their com-
' 404 U.S. at 510.
Id. at 510-11 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
N Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
i
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petitors from meaningful access to the courts. Distinguishing the
regulation of ordinary political activity from the higher standards
that may be required-of litigants, the Court stated:
Yet unethical conduct in the setting of the adjudicatory pro-
cess often results in sanctions. Perjury of witnesses is one exam-
ple. Use of a patent obtained by fraud to exclude a competitor
from the market may involve a violation of the antitrust laws, as
we held in Walker Process Equipment v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp. Conspiracy with a licensing authority to
eliminate a competitor may also result in an antitrust transgres-
sion. Similarly, bribery of a public purchasing agent may con-
stitute a violation of §2(c) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act.
There are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible prac-
tice which may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes
and which may result in antitrust violations. Misrepresenta-
tions, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when
used in the adjudicatory process. Opponents before agencies or
courts often think poorly of the other's tactics, motions, or
defenses and may readily call them baseless. One claim, which a
court or agency may think baseless, may go unnoticed; but a pat-
tern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the
factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial pro-
cesses have been abused. That may be a difficult line to discern
and draw. But once it is drawn, the case is established that
abuse of those processes produced an illegal result, viz., effec-
tively barring respondents from access to the agencies and
courts. Insofar as the administrative or judicial processes are in-
volved, actions of that kind cannot acquire immunity by seeking
refuge under the umbrella of "political expression."8
These leading authorities and their numerous progeny in the
lower courts indicate that a Noerr-Pennington analysis involves
three steps, each of which may present close questions. First, it
must be established that an element of the claim in question in-
volves defendant's direct petitioning for governmental action.
" 404 U.S. at 512-13. Justices Stewart and Brennan, concurring in the judgment, ex-
pressed the view that the antitrust laws and the first amendment do not suggest the pro-
priety of a distinction between influencing legislatures and influencing courts. Although
they agreed that perjury, fraud, bribery, or misrepresentation in connection with the litiga-
tion might render the activity subject to antitrust liability, they noted that defendants in
the case at bar were not charged with such activities. The concurring justices joined in the
judgment remanding the case for trial only because the complaint could be read as alleging
an intent to discourage and prevent plaintiffs from exercising their right to engage in litiga-
tion. Id. at 516-18. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not take part in the case.
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Purely private conduct has been held not to qualify for Noerr-
Pennington protection even though intended to provoke a decision
by administrative authorities" or the courts.9
If defendant did communicate directly with a governmental
body, the second question is whether its primary purpose in doing
so was to seek action by that body in a sovereign capacity91 or
whether the conduct was a "sham" in that defendant's actual in-
tent was to interfere directly .with its competitors92 or with the
process of competition. For instance, if competitors engage in a
data sharing program that is related to their petitioning for
governmental relief but which also has a negative impact on com-
petition among themselves, a very delicate question could be
presented.93
If defendants' primary purpose was indeed to bring about ac-
tion by the government, the final question then becomes whether,
in the course of their contact with the governmental agency in
question, they acted in a manner that was lawful and privileged
under the first amendment -taking into account that the scope of
first amendment protection is wider in some spheres of activity,
such as lobbying and political campaigning, than it is in other
areas, such as litigation. Once again, the courts sometimes have
trouble resolving this kind of question. ' Nevertheless, despite the
difficulties that remain, Noerr-Pennington analysis is quite dif-
ferent from an analysis that starts afresh with each case, balanc-
ing all conceivable factors including the importance of antitrust
" Mid-Texas Communicating Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 268 (1981)(ATT's refusal to interconnect with a competitor
not protected).
Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 624 F.2d 476 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 1360 (1981)(defiance of statute requiring dirqct payment to
clinical psychologists not protected where defendants did not initiate litigation to test the
validity of their position).
" See note 7 supra.
2 California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
'" See Fischel, supra note 18, at 118.
" See, e.g., Woods Exploration and Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1971); Israel v. Baxter Labs, Inc., 466 F.2d 272
(D.C. Cir. 1972)(no immunity for supplying false information to an administrative agency).
" Compare Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 1980-81
Trade Cas. 1 63,583 (D. Del. 1980)(no immunity for coercive group boycott intended to
secure administrative action; Sherman Act operates in this context as a reasonable regula-
tion of the noncommunicative impact of expressive conduct), with Crown Central
Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 1980-2 Trade Cas. 63,327 (M.D. Pa. 1980)(similar boycott
found to be politically communicative conduct within the scope of first amendment and
Noerr-Pennington protection).
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policy and the value of protecting the integrity of political institu-
tions.
IV. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW ON APPLICATION OF
ANTITRUST LAW TO SOLICITATION OF FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN ACTS
As we have seen, some contend (i) that the public policy em-
bodied in the Sherman Act is so important that all combinations
the purpose or effort of which is to bring about an unreasonable
restraint of trade effectuated by means of governmental action
are forbidden, with the sole exception of those governmental con-
tacts privileged under the first amendment, and (ii) that inasmuch
as the first amendment has no application to the petitioning of
foreign sovereigns, the rationale of Noerr-Pennington and Califor-
nia Motor Transport does not apply to extraterritorial conduct."
Each proposition is highly debatable and presents difficult legal
issues. The first issue, which turns on legislative intent concern-
ing the scope of the Sherman Act, is considered in part IV of this
article. The second issue, concerning first amendment limitations
on Congress' use of its interstate commerce power to regulate
foreign conduct, is considered in part V.
The Supreme Court has never ruled definitively on the question
whether contacts with foreign governments enjoy protection from
antitrust liability-the issue is an open question. 7 In United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp.," decided in 1927 (long before the
Noerr opinion), the government alleged that defendants conspired
in violation of the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act" to
monopolize the purchase of sisal from Mexican producers as well
as its importation into, and sale in, the United States. As a part of
their concerted activity, defendants induced the legislatures of
Mexico and Yucatan to enact legislation discriminating against
other purchasers of sisal.
The district court dismissed the case, evidently on the ground
that the gravamen of the complaint was the inducement of foreign
government acts and that such inducement had been held outside
the scope of United States antitrust laws in American Banana Co.
See text accompanying notes 13-19 supra.
See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
274 U.S. 268 (1927).
Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1976), forbids combinations in
restraint of trade in connection with the importation of goods into the United States.
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v. United Fruit Co.100 In American Banana, the Supreme Court
held that plaintiff had no claim under the Sherman Act for defen-
dant's inducing the government of Costa Rica to seize the proper-
ty of the plaintiff. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on
the act-of-state doctrine as well as the now-discredited view that
the tortious quality of an act will be judged solely by the law of
the place where the act occurs.
The Supreme Court in Sisal Sales reversed the lower court, hold-
ing that although the complaint was "rambling and obscure," never-
theless, "enough is alleged to indicate a meritorious cause .... "101
The Court went on to state:
Here we have a contract, combination, and conspiracy entered
into by parties within the United States and made effective by
acts done therein. The fundamental object was control of both
importation and sale of sisal and complete monopoly of both in-
ternal and external trade and commerce therein. The United
States complain of a violation of their laws within their own ter-
ritory by parties subject to their jurisdiction, not merely of
something done by another government at the instigation of
private parties. True, the conspirators were aided by
discriminating legislation, but by their own deliberate acts, here
and elsewhere, they brought about forbidden results within the
United States. They are within the jurisdiction of our courts
and may be punished for offenses against our laws.0 2
There is an unusual diversity of opinion concerning the teaching
of Sisal Sales and the significance of its attempt to distinguish
American Banana. Some contend that Sisal Sales is authority that
conspiracies implemented by inducing foreign governmental ac-
tions enjoy no United States antitrust immunity.1 3 Others main-
tain that the distinction turns on whether it was the foreign
government (as in American Banana) or the private party (as in
Sisal Sales) which was the direct cause of the injury."' Still others
are of the view that the facts in Sisal Sales were distinguished
from American Banana in that in Sisal the procurement of govern-
10 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
'o' 274 U.S. at 271.
102 Id at 276 (emphasis added).
See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 52 (5th Cir. 1979); W.
FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 86 (2d ed. 1973); Griffin, A Critique
of the Justice Department's Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 11 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 215, 253-54 (1978).
"04 General Aviation Corp. v. Air Am., Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas. 62,452 at 76,675 (D.D.C.
1979).
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mental action was only one element of the conspiracy."' In subse-
quent decisions, the Supreme Court has twice observed that the
distinction turned on the lack of demonstrated effects on United
States commerce in American Banana."6 Finally, one writer con-
tends that there is a twofold distinction, namely, the absence of
documented effects on American commerce and the absence of
conduct in the United States in American Banana.'7
It may fairly be concluded that the significance of Sisal Sales is
an imponderable question. Fortunately, a more recent Supreme
Court opinion, Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp.,,0 provides somewhat more enlightenment. There, the plain-
tiff claimed that, as part of an unlawful conspiracy to monopolize
the vanadium market, one of the defendants directed its wholly-
owned Canadian subsidiary- which had been given discretionary
power as exclusive purchasing agent for the Canadian govern-
ment under wartime regulations-to exercise its power to pre-
vent the plaintiff from selling in Canada.
The Ninth Circuit held that this claim was barred by Noerr
because defendant's subsidiary was acting in its capacity as agent
of the government.'" However, the Supreme Court held that
Noerr was inapplicable, because there was "no indication that the
[Canadian Metals] Controller or any other official within the struc-
ture of the Canadian Government approved or would have ap-
proved of joint efforts to monopolize the production and sale of
vanadium or directed that purchases from Continental be
stopped.""' The Court further stated in dictum:
The case of Eastern R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., cited by the court below and much relied upon by
respondents here, is plainly inapposite. The Court there held not
cognizable under the Sherman Act a complaint charging, in
essence, that the defendants had engaged in a concerted publicity
campaign to foster the adoption of laws and law enforcement prac-
tices inimical to plaintiffs' business. Finding no basis for imputing
to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate political activity, a pur-
pose which would have encountered serious constitutional bar-
'' Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir.
1977).
'0 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962); Steele
v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952).
"01 Corporate Lobbyists Abroad, supra note 18, at 1267.
0 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
,00 289 F.2d 86, 94 (9th Cir. 1961).
370 U.S. at 706.
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riers, the Court ruled the defendants' activities to be outside the
ban of the Act "at least insofar as those activities comprised mere
solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage
and enforcement of laws." In this case, respondents' conduct is
wholly dissimilar to that of the defendants in Noerr.
Respondents were engaged in private commercial activity, no
element of which involved seeking to procure the passage or en-
forcement of laws. To subject them to liability under the Sher-
man Act for eliminating a competitor from the Canadian market
by exercise of the discretionary power conferred upon Electro
Met of Canada by the Canadian Government would effectuate
the purposes of the Sherman Act and would not remotely in-
fringe upon any of the constitutionally protected freedoms
spoken of in Noerr."
Because the defendant in Continental Ore was never shown to
have induced the Canadian government to adopt an an-
ticompetitive policy, it was unnecessary for the Court to deter-
mine whether such hypothetical inducement would be protected
by Noerr"2 and the case therefore cannot be regarded as a prece-
dent directly supporting the extraterritorial application of Noerr-
Pennington. However, if the Court had believed that Noerr was
not applicable to a foreign government, the Continental Ore opi-
nion probably would have said so." Hence, the opinion lends no
comfort to those who contend that Noerr-Pennington has a purely
domestic application."'
As previously noted, one lower court case, Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Oil & Gas Co., held that Noerr-
Pennington should not be extended, at least on the facts alleged in
that case, to foreign governments." 5 There, plaintiff asserted an
antitrust claim based on defendant's instigation of a territorial
dispute between two Arabian sheikhdoms, as a result of which the
plaintiff was prevented from enjoying the fruits of its concession
agreement with one of the governments. Noting that "the
,. 370 U.S. at 707-08 (emphasis added).
.. Similarly, in United States v. Amax, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,467 (N.D. Ill. 1977), it
was held that Noerr-Pennington did not bar prosecution for voluntary activities enjoying
the approval of a foreign government; again, the issue of immunity for solicitation of
government action was not reached.
"' See International Antitrust Guide, supra note 11, Case N.
.l. One writer has stated that Continental Ore "impliedly created a foreign governmental
exception to Noerr." Immunities, supra note 18, at 500 n.62 (1978). As the preceding discus-
sion indicates, this view is clearly not correct.
"1 331 F. Supp. 92, 107-8 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd per curiam, on other grounds, 461 F.2d
1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
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threshold question is whether the teaching of these cases [Noerr
and Pennington] is applicable where foreign governments are in-
volved",' the court held:
Examination of the premises underlying Noerr indicates that
the case's rationales do not readily fit into a foreign context,
such as the facts of this case. One of the roots of the Noerr deci-
sion was a desire to avoid a construction of the antitrust laws
that might trespass upon the First Amendment right of petition.
The constitutional freedom "to petition the Government" carries
limited if indeed any applicability to the petitioning of foreign
governments.2" A second basis of Noerr is a concern with insur-
ing that, "[iln a representative democracy such as this," lawmak-
ing organs retain access to the opinions of their constituents
unhampered by collateral regulation. Noerr has been held inap-
plicable to situations in which this relationship has not been
deemed threatened. [Citations omitted]. The persuasion of Mid-
dle Eastern states alleged in the present case is a far cry from
the political process with which Noerr was concerned.
In sum, the interests asserted in this case are dissimilar to
those that Noerr was concerned with safeguarding; therefore,
the wholesale application of that exception to the Sherman Act
appears inappropriate.' 7
Footnote 26 in the above quotation does not bear on the ques-
tion whether the constitutional right of petition applies to foreign
governments, but instead states:
One authority extracts from Noerr and Continental Ore the
notion that the antitrust laws do not apply to petitioning a
democratic government. P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 187 &
n. 206 (1967).
This interpretation, not presently adopted herein, would in
any event not cover much of the conduct alleged in the instant
complaint.' 8
The italicized language in this footnote seems to indicate that
the court was making a blanket holding that Noerr-Pennington
does not apply at all to contacts with foreign governments.
Although this interpretation of the Occidental opinion is perhaps
open to question, the case is clearly inhospitable to the extrater-
ritorial application of Noerr-Pennington.
" 331 F. Supp. at 107.
" Id. at 107-08. The Court further held, however, that since plaintiffs alleged injuries
flowed from an act-of-state, the act-of-state doctrine required that the claim be dismissed.
"I Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
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In 1977, the Justice Department expressed a view contrary to
that of the Occidental court and indicated that, in its opinion,
Noerr-Pennington should apply generally to contacts with foreign
governments.1 '9 However, as has been noted, some commentators
have joined with the Occidental view and expressed a lack of en-
thusiasm for such extraterritorial application of the doctrine, 20
while others contend that although the policy bases underlying
the domestic Noerr-Pennington doctrine are largely inapplicable
abroad, other considerations support extraterritorial application
of the doctrine.'21
V. THE SCOPE OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS As APPLIED TO
SOLICITATION OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
Let us assume for the sake of discussion that the first amend-
ment has no application whatsoever to communications with
foreign governments'" and that Congress (insofar as it is acting
within the scope of its power to regulate the interstate and
foreign commerce of the United States) will be deemed by
American courts to have plenary power to prescribe rules govern-
ing the manner'" or substance"u of contacts between private par-
ties and foreign governmental bodies. Even when this assumption
is made, there are a number of reasons, both practical and legal, to
adopt the view that the antitrust laws apply no more broadly to
political activities abroad than in the United States.
A. The Noerr-Pennington Rationale
No one doubts that all conduct privileged under the first
amendment is immunized from antitrust liability. But as has been
noted before, it is arguable whether this rule is premised on (i) a
conflict between the antitrust laws, especially section 1 of the
" International Antitrust Guide, supra note 11, Case N. Likewise, in Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981), the court held, without
discussion of the issue considered in this article, that Noerr-Pennington protected defen-
dants from liability for joint solicitation of the Japanese and United States governments.
Id. at 1155-57.
12 See text accompanying notes 16, 18 supra.
... See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
The validity of this assumption is considered in part VI infra.
13 For instance, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1977),
forbids "domestic concerns" and issuers of registered securities from making payments to
foreign officials in order to influence their actions.
"z' For a discussion of the Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1976), a 1798 statute regulating
communications with foreign governments, see note 239 infra.
[Vol. 11:3
THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
Sherman Act, and the first amendment, a conflict that is resolved
by the Constitution's precedence over statutory enactments, or (ii)
the use of the first amendment as an authoritative guide to con-
gressional intent in much the same way that constitutional prin-
ciples concerning the nature of the United States federal
system,' , federal statutes regulating the securities industry,"2
state and federal laws condemning perjury," and other statutes
and case-law doctrines have been used to give specific content to
the broad congressional delegation to the judiciary that the Sher-
man Act represents."
As discussed above,"2 the Supreme Court in Noerr explicitly
declined to find any conflict between the Sherman Act and the
first amendment. One of the defendants' affirmative defenses in
Noerr was "the contention that the activities complained of were
constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.. ., " The
Court stated, however, that "[b]ecause of the view we take of the
proper construction of the Sherman Act, we find it unnecessary to
consider any of these other defenses."'3'
Although the Supreme Court's later opinion in California Motor
Transport deemphasized the Noerr concern with the characteriza-
tion of activity as political or nonpolitical and emphasized instead
the first amendment issues, nothing in that opinion overrules
Noerr's holding that Congress never intended to subject ordinary
political conduct to antitrust scrutiny.' 2 Looking back on Noerr in
its 1977 opinion in City of Lafayette, the Court stated:
The presumption against repeal by implication reflects the
understanding that the antitrust laws establish overarching and
fundamental policies, a principle which argues with equal force
against implied exclusions.
Two policies have been held sufficiently weighty to override
the presumption against implied exclusions from coverage of the
antitrust laws. In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., the Court held that, regardless of an-
ticompetitive purpose or intent, a concerted effort by persons to
influence lawmakers to enact legislation beneficial to
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1977).
, Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
1 See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 406 n.32 (1977).
12 See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
1 365 U.S. 132 n.6.
181 Id
18 See text accompanying notes 80-88 supra.
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themselves or detrimental to competitors was not within the
scope of the antitrust laws. Although there is nothing in the
language of the statute or its history which would indicate that
Congress considered. such an exclusion, the impact of two cor-
relative principles was held to require the conclusion that the
presumption should not support a finding of coverage. The first
is that a contrary construction would impede the open com-
munication between the policy and its lawmakers which is vital
to the functioning of a representative democracy. Second, "and
of at least equal significance," is the threat to the constitutional-
ly protected right of petition which a contrary construction
would entail.11
With its references to the "construction," "coverage," and "scope"
of the antitrust laws, this passage is fully consistent with Noerr's
finding that there is no conflict between the antitrust laws and
the first amendment and that there is some additional basis
separate and apart from first amendment considerations for find-
ing that the Sherman Act does not apply generally to political ac-
tivity.
Some courts and commentators adhere to the view that, under
California Motor Transport, the Sherman Act is correctly
understood as applying to all political activity otherwise within its
scope'" except where the activity in question enjoys a first
11 435 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). In the footnote the Court went on
to make the accurate observations that:
Cases subsequent to Pennington have emphasized the possible constitutional
infirmity in the antitrust laws that a contrary construction would entail in light of
the serious threat to First Amendment freedoms that would have been
presented. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690, 707-708 (1962); California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 516 (1972)(Stewart, J., concurring judgment).
Id at 399-400 n.17.
18 Communication with a governmental body that leads to a diminution of the com-
petitive process or an injury to one's competitors is by no means necessarily within the
general rules of Sherman Act jurisprudence. See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 2.23, at 86 (2d ed. 1973). However, in a private litigation, if the defendant
has procured governmental action (not amounting to an act of state); if the link between
defendant's conduct and the resulting governmental action is sufficiently direct, see Out-
board Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1979); if plaintiff was within the
"target area" of defendant's conduct, see Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358
(9th Cir. 1955); and if he suffered "antitrust injury," see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-
Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977), then damages may be recovered, absent Noerr-Pennington im-
munity.
Even if the defendant was not successful in procuring any governmental act, the mere at-
tempt may have effected a true barrier to entry, raised perceptibly the cost of entry or con-
tinued competition (as was the case in California Motor Transport) or caused some harm to
the competitive process with resulting "antitrust injury" to private parties.
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amendment privilege. 13 Others disagree.1" The issue, however,
has never been resolved because the courts have never dealt with
a set of facts exhibiting conduct which is (i) actionable under the
general principles of antitrust jurisprudence, (ii) in which liability
is predicated on communications with government officials who
are acting in a governmental (i.e., noncommercial) capacity 13 7 and
who are not coconspirators,1" (iii) where the conduct in question is
legitimate, given its setting, in the California Motor Transport
sense, (iv) but unprivileged under the first amendment.1"
In a domestic context, such a combination of factors obviously
would be rare, because in almost all instances conduct sufficiently
legitimate to survive scrutiny under California Motor Transport
also would be protected by the first amendment. But assuming, as
we still are, that the first amendment does not apply to foreign
government solicitation cases, such a combination of factors would
be present in many cases involving foreign political activity or
other governmental contacts.
Noerr suggests,' though in a rather equivocal fashion, that Con-
gress meant to draw a basic distinction between political and com-
mercial activity-a distinction based not on a party's motive,
because political activity is often (perhaps usually) motivated by
the desire to advance one's commercial interests, but rather on
the nature of the conduct in question; the distinction is between
influencing a governmental body versus engaging in commercial
transactions. 0 The distinction between commercial and political
' See note 6 supra.
,8 See note 6 supra and text accompanying note 19 supra.
1 See note 7 supra.
See Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
... In Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980), the court decided the Noerr-Pennington issue (presented by
defendant's politically-motivated group boycott) on grounds of statutory coverage rather
than the first amendment, but also held that the conduct in question was privileged under
the first amendment. In Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp.
696 (D. Colo. 1975), the plaintiff producer charged that defendant trade association made il-
legal payments to United States government personnel, as a result of which minimum milk
prices became politically sensitive, as a result of which administrative agencies have subse-
quently refused to raise the minimum prices, and as a result of which plaintiff has suffered
injury and has a claim under the antitrust laws. The Court purportedly relied on Noerr in
dismissing the complaint, holding that: "In fact, the harm to competition of which plaintiffs
complain is, by their own allegations, wholly at odds with the object of the alleged con-
spiracy." Id. at 705. The court's failure to discuss the antitrust injury doctrine announced in
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowling-o-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977), is understandable, since the
latter case was decided two years subsequent to Cow Palace.
140 Fischel, supra note 18, at 96, properly notes that many cases subsequent to Noerr,
notably California Motor Transport and United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 417 U.S. 901
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activity is familiar in other legal contexts and probably no more
difficult to draw in practice than are many other issues of legal
characterization.
Although Noerr and its progeny distinguish political from com-
mercial activity -and sovereign acts of government from commer-
cial activity -and although Noerr rested in part on the view that
it would be unwise to predicate Sherman Act liability on the in-
ducing of a governmental act that is itself lawful,14 2 it must be
noted that under current law it is not true that all governmental,
mandatory, noncommercial acts are outside the scope of the Sher-
man Act. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Mid-
cal Aluminum, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of an
injunction against the enforcement of a California statute requir-
ing resale price maintenance of wine on the ground that California
had acted in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court
found that the doctrine of Parker v. Brown,'" under which state
action of an anticompetitive nature may be immune from the Sher-
man Act, was not applicable. Under the Parker doctrine, which is
"grounded in our federal structure,""' the state regulatory action
must be both "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as
state policy" and "actively supervised."'" It was the latter test,
presumably intended to ensure that consumer interests are taken
continuously into account, that the California program failed to
meet, inasmuch as there was no attempt to make sure that the
resale prices were fair and reasonable."7
Where both tests are met, Parker v. Brown immunity still ap-
plies. It is thus presumably still the law that one of the fifty states
of the Union may enact valid legislation ensuring that its own pro-
ducers receive supracompetitive profits at the expense of its own
consumers as well as those located in other jurisdictions.'" Local
(1974), make it clear that Sherman Act liability may be based on an attempt to induce
governmental action. But that does not prove that Noerr was incorrect in indicating that
Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to apply to ordinary political activity.
... See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(d), 1605(a)(2) (1976)(no
immunity inter alia for commercial acts of foreign states outside the United States which
cause a direct effect in this country).
... 365 U.S. at 136. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
445 U.S. 97 (1980).
4 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
445 U.S. at 104.
Id. at 106 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(Brennan, J.)).
147 Id
'" Of course, such legislation may be invalid if it constitutes an undue interference with
interstate commerce. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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governments, however, even when acting in a governmental ca-
pacity, may not so exalt their own parochial interests except in
circumstances where the two Parker tests referred to above are
met."' Clearly, then, although it may once have been the law that
all governmental acts of a noncommercial nature are outside the
purview of the antitrust laws, that simple distinction no longer
holds. 150
Likewise, it is not accurate to say that all genuine attempts to
induce government to act in a noncommercial capacity are outside
the scope of the antitrust laws. 15' By no means, however, does it
follow that the distinctions between sovereign and commercial
acts of governments, and between political and commercial behav-
ior of private parties, are without antitrust significance. On the
contrary, the legislative history of the Sherman Act, though hard-
ly dispositive for present purposes, provides some indications that
such distinctions were within the contemplation of Congress.
In particular, Senator George, who was concerned that the law
might be construed to outlaw some of the activities of temperance
societies, responded to a question about legislative activities by
observing: "I have thought possibly that the courts might say that
the right of political organizations to bring about political results
by Legislation was not embraced within the provisions of the
bill."1"2 To this somewhat equivocal statement should be added the
comment by Senator Sherman to the effect that the bill "does not
interfere in the slightest degree with voluntary associations made
to affect the public opinion to advance the interests of a particular
trade or occupation."'' 5
In short, the legislative history, though not dispositive, pro-
vides rather more specific support for the Noerr result than
Justice Black in Noerr seems to have been aware of and certainly
lends no support to the contention that the policy behind the pro-
tection of competition and of consumer interests is of such over-
whelming importance that all countervailing considerations
should be swept away.
Exceptions and implied repeals of the antitrust laws are highly
See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 403, 408 (1978).
IN See id. at 428-41 (dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart deploring the majority's failure
to adhere to Parker's distinction of private from state action).
See text accompanying note 88 supra.
20 Cong. Rec. 1459, quoted in Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 620
F.2d 1301, 1307 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). For a discussion of the legislative
history, see 620 F.2d at 1304-09.
11 21 Cong. Rec. 2562 (1890), quoted in Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 204b n.3.
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disfavored in view of the importance of antitrust as the Magna
Carta of our economic liberty. At the same time, however, it is
well recognized that the words of the Sherman Act are of such
generality that they must be approached as would the provisions
of the Constitution. 15'
The prohibitions of the Sherman Act were not stated in terms
of precision or of crystal clarity and the Act itself did not define
them. In consequence of the vagueness of the language, perhaps
not uncalculated, the courts have been left to give content to the
statute, and in performance of that function it is appropriate
that courts should interpret its word in the light of its
legislative history and of the particular evils at which the
legislation was aimed.'
In exercising their function of "giving content to the statute,"
the courts not infrequently have been faced with what may be re-
ferred to as systemic questions. The Noerr-Pennington cases in-
volve the proper "fit" between the policy in favor of competition
and what Professor Emerson has called "the system of freedom of
expression." 57 Parker v. Brown and its progeny deal with the
proper ordering of the relationship between state and national
economic regulation in the United States federal system."
Similarly, a number of other judicial decisions have dealt with the
often abstruse question of the relationship between regulatory
regimes in particular industries such as insurance, l5 9 shipping,"
and securities" 1 and the general policies of the Sherman Act.
The problem dealt with here is analogous: it concerns the issue
of the proper scope of the antitrust laws insofar as they affect the
political systems of foreign nations. The question is novel and un-
settled and it is abundantly clear that the answer does not follow
mechanically from Noerr, Parker, or any other authority. Never-
theless, the authorities make clear that the analysis should pro-
ceed by posing the question whether, notwithstanding the
weighty policies of the Sherman Act, there are not still weightier
z See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
15 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940)(footnote omitted).
l" T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
See City of Lafayette v. Lousiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400-08 (1978).
"' E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930
(1966).
" E.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973).
... E.g., Gordon v. New York Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
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considerations 2 relating to the international system in which we
live that prevent the Sherman Act from being correctly under-
stood as having general application to solicitation of foreign
governments.
B. Comity
By hypothesis, the question posed involves a situation present-
ing a clash between a foreign government's policy of protecting
the integrity of its governmental processes, as well as its ability
to communicate with private parties, and the United States gov-
ernment's policy of protecting its consumers or producers from
foreign anticompetitive activity. First amendment considerations
aside, the principal reason for reading the antitrust laws as sub-
ject to a general rule favoring the integrity of foreign governmen-
tal processes over the preservation of competition in foreign trade
lies in the nature of the international system. Just as the doctrine
of Parker v. Brown holds that antitrust law must be construed in
light of the nature of the federal system in which it functions, so
also a construction of antitrust law that would impinge on the
sovereignty of other states in the international system is unsound
as well as unworkable.
This approach is not dictated by considerations of international
etiquette. It is not founded on a mere desire to avoid hurting the
feelings of foreigners, nor is its primary basis a perceived need to
avoid judicial decisions that prejudice the foreign relations of the
United States, although these are all factors to be considered. 3
The principal basis is rather a recognition that we live in a world
of sovereign states and that the right to regulate political activity
is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty. Therefore, absent a
clear contrary indication of congressional intent, based on the
principle of statutory interpretation that statutory constructions
contrary to the principles of international law are disfavored,'" it
should be held that the antitrust laws go no further in regulating
communications with foreign governments than they do in a do-
mestic context.
The doctrine of international comity was described as follows in
this often-quoted passage from the 1895 Supreme Court opinion in
Hilton v. Guyot:
But see City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 399 (1978).
"' See text accompanying notes 192-209 infra.
'" FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 1980-1 Trade Cas. § 62,026 at
77,098 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of
the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent
to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its ter-
ritory, whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by ju-
dicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of
another nation, depends upon what our greatest jurists have
been content to call "the comity of nations." Although the
phrase has been often criticized, no satisfactory substitute has
been suggested.
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts
of another nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.'65
The doctrine of comity applies not only to recognition of foreign
court judgments' and to resolution of situations of direct conflict
between the laws of the United States and a foreign country,'67
but also as a principle of statutory construction.'M In other words,
the basic idea that conflicts with the laws of other sovereign na-
tions should be avoided, especially where foreign state interests
that we understand to be legitimate are at stake, is an idea that
may, where appropriate, affect either the manner of enforcement
of American law 69 or the content of the substantive law. 70
Clearly, comity has some application to the problem under con-
sideration.'' How it should apply is more problematic. In their
brief discussion of the issue considered herein, Areeda and
Turner remark that "every government, whether representative
159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
'Id.
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir.
1977); Restatement, supra note 47, § 40.
,6 See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). It is axiomatic
that the Timberlane-Mannington doctrine uses the doctrine of comity not to limit the exer-
cise of legislative power but rather as an aid in finding legislative intent.
'" Restatement, supra note 47, § 40.
170 For example, comity has been recognized as an appropriate consideration to be
employed by an administrative agency in exercising its power to implement legislation by
appropriate regulations. See Statement of Basis and Purpose of Rules Implementing Title
II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,452,
33,456 (July 31, 1978).
1" See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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or not, is privileged to set the terms on which persons within its
borders may seek its legislation, decrees, or other sovereign ac-
tion."'7 But one supposes that governments are equally "privi-
leged" to regulate their own economies, and yet a private party
who procures a valid foreign act is not necessarily immune from
United States liability.' Nor does procurement of a valid United
States governmental regulatory act necessarily provide immunity
from foreign prosecution.7
Where foreign economic regulation is concerned, comity dic-
tates a factor-based, case-by-case approach. This point is il-
lustrated not only by Timberlane-Mannington but in other areas
as well.7 5 Comity is not always applied, however, in an ad hoc
manner. For instance, section 98 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts of Law provides: "A valid judgment rendered in a
foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be
recognized in the United States so far as the immediate parties
and the underlying issues are concerned."'
76
It is evident that recognition of foreign judgments could be
determined under a rule as ad hoc as the Mannington Mills rule,
and yet a different approach is taken. Why? The answer seems to
be based partly on institutional 'considerations, or considerations
of what makes sense in terms of how the system operates, and in
particular on the powerful policy that litigation eventually must
come to an end.' In addition, the law recognizes that what the
foreign courts are doing is essentially the same as what American
courts are doing, although they may do it differently. 78
The analogy can be pressed too far, however, because as soon
as the courts perceive a clash of fundamental public policies,
"' Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, 239, at 275.
.73 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
174 See Baker, Antitrust Conflicts Between Friends: Canada and the United States in the
Mid-1970's, 11 CORNELL J. INT'L L. 165, 193 (1978)(recommending that foreign countries pro-
secute U.S. foreign export associations, notwithstanding their exemption from U.S. an-
titrust liability under the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976)).
" See United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); Restatement,
supra note 47, § 40.
.T. See also Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (1962)[hereinafter cited
as Uniform Act], presently enacted in 11 states, which is more detailed (e.g., in terms of
specificity as to what constitutes a "fair trial"), but still lays down a general rule capable of
yielding relatively predictable results.
177 Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 98, comment b (1969).
175 "As indicated in that decision [Hilton v. Guyot], a mere difference in the procedural
system is not a sufficient basis for non-recognition. A case of serious injustice must be in-
volved." Uniform Act, supra note 176, Commissioners' Comment.
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the general rule as to recognition of foreign judgments ceases to
apply and an ad hoc analysis is substituted.179 Nonetheless, the
analogy is still suggestive. What it suggests is that, if what
foreign institutions are doing is fundamentally the same as what
the United States institutions do (albeit with different methods
and sometimes with different results), it may be the wisest course
of action to give effect to the outcomes abroad, especially if in-
stitutional considerations indicate that a similar foreign respect
for our governmental processes is desirable.
C. Legislation Contrary to Internationally Recognized
Principles of Justice
The jurisdictional basis underlying extraterritorial application
of United States antitrust law, at least insofar as foreign defen-
dants are concerned,1 10 is the "objective territorial principle."181
That principle is authoritatively stated in section 18 of the
Restatement, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory
and causes an effect within its territory, if...
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of ac-
tivity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the ter-
ritory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable
result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is
not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally
recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal
systems."12
Section 18(b)(iv) is illuminated by the following two illustrations:
10. State A has a law establishing a state monopoly on the sale
of coffee. X sends parcels of coffee from state B to A for sale to
... See Uniform Act, supra note 76, § 4(b)(3)(providing that a foreign judgment need not
be recognized if inter alia it is based on a cause of action which is repugnant to the forum
state's public policy).
" As recognized in Comment a to section 18 of the Restatement, jurisdiction over the
foreign acts of United States citizens may be based on the nationality principle. The thesis
is advanced below that the use of American antitrust law to interfere with freedom of
speech and the right to petition in foreign nations would be contrary to recognized prin-
ciples of justice within Restatement § 18(b)(iv). If that argument is valid, it would be
anomalous, to say the least, to hold that the nationality principle would uphold such
jurisdiction over United States citizens where jurisdiction over foreigners is impermissible.
181 See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 610
(9th Cir. 1977).
12 (Emphasis added).
[Vol. 11:3
THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
private persons. A has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule making
this action criminal.
11. While in state A, X broadcasts a program intended for
listeners in state B that praises the way of life in A. The pro-
gram is heard in B and leads there to criticism of the govern-
ment of B. B has no jurisdiction to prescribe a rule making this
action criminal. 183
Section 18 is widely recognized as an authoritative statement
concerning the objective territorial principle and its limitations in
American jurisprudence. For instance, the Second Circuit has
held that the objective territorial principle must be applied with
caution, particularly in an international context, and that "[alt
minimum the conduct must meet the tests laid down in §18 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law. . . ."" Similarly,
the legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
indicates that that statute is to be construed consistently with
section 18.11
Freedom of speech and petition should be regarded as "prin-
ciples of justice generally recognized by states that have
reasonably developed legal systems" within section 18(b)(iv) of the
Restatement. To the extent that this proposition may require any
proof, reference may be made to the constitutions of many na-
tions. For instance, article 4 of the French Constitution provides
that "[p]olitical parties and groups . . . shall be formed freely and
shall carry on their activities freely."'86 Article 21 of the Japanese
Constitution provides that "[f]reedom of assembly and association
as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are
guaranteed."'87 To like effect is section 19(1)(a) of the Indian Con-
stitution, which states that "[a]ll citizens shall have the right.., to
freedom of speech and expression.""'
' Restatement, supra note 47, § 18, comment g.
' Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972).
... Congress explained that the third clause of section 1605(a)(2) embraces "commercial
conduct abroad having direct effects within the United States which would subject such
conduct to the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States consistent with principles set
forth in section 18, Restatement of the Law (Second) Foreign Relations Laws of the United
States (1965)" H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, 6604, 6617. Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056,
1062 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
I" V A. BLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, The
French Constitution, at 4.
187 VIII BLAUSTEIN & FLANZ, The Constitution of Japan, at 3.
VII BLAUSTEIN & FLANZ, The Constitution of India, at 6.
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International recognition of the protection of free speech and
the right of petition as required by the principles of justice is fur-
ther shown by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ap-
proved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948
with the support of the United States,'" which provides:
Article 20
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and association.
Article 21
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the Government of
his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. "'
The United States government's commitment to promotion of
civil liberties has been reconfirmed on many occasions, notably in
1975 when the United States signed the Final Act of the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki
Declaration), which provides in pertinent part: "In the field of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States
will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights."19'
Accordingly, as recognized by illustration 11 in the commentary
to section 18 of the Restatement, quoted above, application of the
Sherman Act extraterritorially in a manner that derogates from
the political freedoms enjoyed by foreigners in foreign countries
is contrary to international law as understood by the American
courts, and such a construction should not be adopted, at least in
the absence of a clear indication of congressional intent to enact
legislation contrary to international law.
D. Retaliation by Foreign Countries
Descending from the high-minded plane of concern for interna-
tional human rights, let us take note of a more "practical" con-
sideration. Since World War II, there have been at least twenty
diplomatic protests by foreign countries over American assertions
of extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce its antitrust laws.' 2
'" WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF 1INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (1965).
&Id at 240.
' 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1295 (1975).
... Foreign Resentment over Extraterritorial Enforcement is Growing, Conference is
Told, 993 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) A-7, 8 (Dec. 11, 1980)(reporting remarks by
Joel Griffin).
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American jurisprudence in this field is widely believed to be both
contrary to international law'93 and premised on a failure to ap-
preciate how foreign political processes operate. 9 "
We now have passed the era of the diplomatic note and entered
the age of foreign "blocking" legislation. 9' The most drastic
legislation was enacted by France in July 1980. It provides in per-
tinent part:
Article 1. Subject to treaties or international agreements, it
is prohibited for any individual of French nationality or who
usually resides on French territory and for any officer, rep-
resentative , agent, or employee of an entity having a head of-
fice or establishment in France to communicate to foreign public
authorities, in writing, orally or by any other means, anywhere,
documents or information relating to economic, commercial, in-
dustrial, financial or technical matters, the communication of
which is capable of harming the sovereignty, security, or essen-
tial economic interests of France or contravening public policy,
specified by the administrative authority in so far as is needed.
Article 1-bis. Subject to any treaties or international
agreements and the laws and regulations in force, it is pro-
hibited for any person to request, to investigate, or to com-
municate in writing, orally or by any other means, documents or
information relating to economic, commercial, industrial, finan-
cial or technical matters leading to the establishment of proof
with a view to foreign administrative or judicial proceedings or
as a part of such proceedings.
Article 2. Persons aimed at by articles 1 and 1-bis are re-
quired to inform without delay the relevant minister when they
are in receipt of any request concerning such communications.
Article 3. Without prejudice to any greater penalties provid-
198 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [19781 A.C. 547 (H.L.).
The cogent observation has been made that
[a] policy endorsed by the U.S. Administration may or may not enjoy the sup-
port of Congress. When a Canadian Minister announces Government policy,
however, it is recognized that implementation of that policy can, if necessary, be
secured through the enactment of legislation by virtue of the Government's ma-
jority in Parliament. But both the Government and the private sector may prefer
to avoid the formality and rigidity of legislation, and compliance with policy may
instead be secured through discussions and voluntary action permitted, but not
compelled, by domestic law. This is a feature of the Canadian system of govern-
ment which may differ from that of the United States and which the doctrine of
"foreign compulsion," if rigidly applied, would be unable to accommodate.
Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A
View from Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 212 (1978).
11 Foreign Resentment over Extraterritorial Enforcement is Growing, Conference is
Told, 993 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. A-7 (Dec. 11, 1980).
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ed by law, any violation of the provisions of articles 1 and 1-bis
of this law will be punished by imprisonment of from two to six
months and by a fine of from 10,000 Francs to 120,000 Francs or
by only one of these two penalties.'
Although the construction and effect of the French statute are
beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that a law of this type is
capable of greatly prejudicing United States governmental pro-
cesses and the legitimate interests of private parties. Yet it
seems clear that the United States would virtually invite more
foreign legislation of this nature, or other unpalatable acts,'97 if its
judiciary undertakes to judge the propriety of foreign political ac-
tivity by United States antitrust standards.
Moreover, France is not the only country whose concern over
extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law has
gone beyond the diplomatic note stage. In 1979, Australia enacted
the Foreign Antitrust Judgment (Restriction of Enforcement)
Act, 9' which permits the Commonwealth Attorney-General to pre-
vent the enforcement of a foreign judgment where either (1) "he is
satisfied that the foreign court exercised jurisdiction in a manner
inconsistent with international law or comity" or (ii) he determines
that Australia's national interests require restriction of enforce-
ment.' "
The Australian legislation was followed one year later, in March
1980, by Britain's enactment of a statute' providing inter alia (i)
that where a foreign discovery order relates to documents or in-
formation outside the territory where it was not entered"' and is
determined by the Secretary of State to be "prejudicial to the
sovereignty of the United Kingdom" 2 or its security or relations
I" Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise 1799 (July
17, 1980)(translation by Bate Toms, Esq.)(emphasis added).
'" Corporate Lobbyists Abroad, supra note 18, written in 1973, suggests that expropria-
tion of American-owned businesses is a possible form of retaliation. Id. at 1279. However, it
would seem that foreign legislation prejudicial to American judicial or other governmental
processes would be a much more logical response.
'" No. 13, Austl. Acts (1979).
1" Note, Antitrust Australian Restrictions on Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 20
HARv. J. INT'L L. 663, 664 (1979).
"' British Statute Seeks to Discourage U.S. Antitrust Suits Against U.K. Firms, 959
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) A-4 (April 10, 1980). The text of the statute styled "An
act to provide protection from requirements, prohibitions and judgments imposed or given
under the laws of countries outside the United Kingdom and affecting the trading or other
interests of persons in the United Kingdom" [hereinafter cited as British Stat.], is quoted in
959 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at F-1 and F-2 (April 10, 1980).
' British Stat., supra note 200, § 2(1)(a).
Id § 2(2)(a).
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with foreign governments, 23 he may prohibit compliance;' (ii) that
foreign antitrust judgments may be denied enforcement;"5 and (iii)
that British citizens and corporations and persons carrying on
business in Britain may have a cause of action for recovery of
foreign judgments in excess of single damages, °6 unless "the pro-
ceedings in which the judgment was given were concerned with
activities exclusively carried on in that country."2 °0 The enactment
of similar damage recovery statutes in other countries is en-
couraged by a provision that foreign judgments based on a cor-
responding statute may be enforced in Britain.2 8 Canada is con-
sidering similar legislation.2 '
In short, American attempts to govern world commodity mar-
kets by United States antitrust principles are being countered by
foreign governmental interference in the American judicial pro-
cess. Obviously, no one can predict what the outcome would be of
a more extreme assertion of United States extraterritorial
jurisdiction, but it seems safe to predict that the reaction would
be very serious.
E. Prejudice to Legitimate Private Interests
Participation in lobbying, litigation, and other governmental
contacts are a natural concomitant to the carrying on of business
abroad, as they are in the United States. As matters now stand,
Americans conducting business abroad must deal not only with
the trade regulation and other laws of their host country but also
with the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.210 Legal
considerations already may unreasonably hinder American
multinational business.21' Refusal to apply Noerr-Pennington to
m Id. § 2(2)(b).
Id. § 2(1).
- Id § 5.
- Id § 6.
- Id § 6(4).
Id. § 7; see British Statute Seeks to Discourage U.S. Antitrust Suits Against U.K.
Firms, 959 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) A-4 (April 10, 1980).
Canadian Legislation would Stymie Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust-Judgments, 973
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) A-19 (July 17, 1980); Canadian Bill Would Permit
Recapture of Multiple Damages, Restrict Recovery, 979 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA)(Aug. 28, 1980).
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1977).
211 The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs noted in 1980 that "[t]he Committee
has been troubled by wide-spread complaints that the application of these laws [antitrust
laws] may have straightjacketed U.S. firms in international trade." S. Rep. No. 96-770, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 2, reprinted in 439 (CCH) Trade Reg. Rep. (Part II)(May 28, 1980).
1981]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
communications with foreign governments would complicate mat-
ters still further.
No doubt the multinationals would survive and flourish, and
would continue to approach foreign governments where so advis-
ed. But in this area, as well as others, where the law becomes inor-
dinately complex, real costs are imposed that may well exceed any
benefits achieved by a flexible legal rule.
F. Protection of United States Economic Interests
Finally, one commentator has adduced the following argument:
The purpose of American antitrust law is nothing less than the
preservation of the traditional economic fabric of this country.
Accordingly, the mandate of the Sherman Act is very broad, and
any judicially created exceptions to it must be as narrow as
possible. Other than its generalized reference to the proper
functioning of a "representative democracy," Noerr itself gives
no clue to the appropriateness of extraterritorial application of
antitrust immunity for corporate petitioners. Since the potential
in most other countries for the enactment of economic legisla-
tion harmful to American interests is much higher than it is in
this country and since foreign lobbying activity by companies
which do business in the United States has a much greater
chance of inducing injurious anticompetitive restraints on
American trade than does domestic lobbying, the term
"representative democracy" should probably be interpreted to
refer primarily to domestic states and the federal government.
In the absence of a clear indication that the court in Noerr in-
tended it, a broader construction seems unwarranted.212
This argument is objectionable on several grounds. First, Noerr
is based on respect for the democratic process. Justice Black made
no attempt to discover the rule that would best ensure wise
economic legislation by the State of Pennsylvania. He sought the
rule that would best protect the process of representative govern-
ment and the civil rights of citizens. Second, as we have seen, the
doctrine of Parker v. Brown holds that the nature of the federal
system requires that states be permitted, within constitutional
limits, to advance the parochial interests of state consumers over
the contrary interests of consumers throughout the country.213
The nature of the international system likewise dictates the inad-
"2 Corporate Lobbyists Abroa4 aupra note 18, at 1276-77.
210 See text accompanying notes 145-148 supra.
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visability of attempting to protect Americans from the an-
ticompetitive acts of other countries by means of interference
with their governmental processes.2 " Third, if the United States
attempts to advance its national economic interest and ideas about
competition at the expense of interference with other nations'
political processes, there is every reason to believe that effective
retaliation will follow swiftly."'
VI. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION
We now return to the question that previously was set aside,
namely, to what extent if any does the first amendment inhibit
Congress, acting within the scope of its power to regulate United
States interstate and foreign commerce, from enacting legislation
interfering with freedom of speech and association for political
ends abroad and the right to petition foreign governments for the
redress of grievances? It is clear that the first amendment applies
to extraterritorial activity related to the United States govern-
ment and its political processes. 6 But that, of course, does not
resolve the separate and distinct issue of whether the first amend-
ment has anything to do with the government and politics of
foreign countries.1
A. Extraterritorial Application of the United States
Constitution
Other commentators on the issue under discussion in this arti-
cle have relied on the antique authorities of The City of Panama218
and Downes v. Bidwell,219 Supreme Court decisions dating respec-
tively from 1879 and 1901, for the propositions (in the words of the
commentators) that "the protection by the Federal Constitution
does not extend to the petitioning of foreign governments ' 220 and
that "[c]orporations have no First Amendment right of petition
overseas."'" This analysis is unsound. As Justice Frankfurter
214 See text accompanying notes 164-179 supra.
215 See text accompanying notes 192-209 supra.
... See text accompanying notes 230-237 infra.
217 See text accompanying notes 238-251 infra.
218 101 U.S. 453 (1879).
182 U.S. 244 (1901).
Corporate Lobbists Abroad, supra note 18, at 1277.
=' McManis, supra note 18, at 240. Graziano, supra note 16, likewise states: "Political ac-
tivity undertaken outside the United States and directed at foreign governments is not con-
stitutionally protected." I&. at 132. He also cites Downes and "The City of Panama."
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noted in 1957, the "view that the Constitution is not operative out-
side the United States" is a "notion which has long since
evaporated."1 2
The City of Panama held simply that, pursuant to a valid
federal statute, the district courts of the Territory of Washington
had jurisdiction in admiralty cases. In the course of arriving at
this conclusion, the Court observed in passing that "[o]ur constitu-
tion, in its operation, is coextensive with our political jurisdic-
tion. . . ."I This obsolete dictum' is cited in support of a ter-
ritorially limited view of the Constitution.
Downes v. Bidwell, the other authority that has been cited to
the effect that there is no constitutional right to petition foreign
governments, 5 is more interesting. The holding of Downes was
that the recently-acquired island of Puerto Rico was not a part of
the United States within the constitutional provision that "all
duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States." However, in the course of a lengthy and scholarly
opinion, the Court twice alluded in dictum to a possible distinction
between provisions of the Constitution, such as the first amend-
ment, going to the power of Congress to enact specified classes of
legislation and provisions, such as the one under consideration, re-
quiring uniformity throughout the United States. The Court
stated:
There is a clear distinction between such prohibitions as to the
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 56 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
101 U.S. 453, 460 (1879).
As late as 1936, the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp. (not cited by Graziano et aL):
It results that the investment of the Federal government with the powers of ex-
ternal sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitu-
tion. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the Federal government as
necessary concomitants of nationality. Neither the Constitution nor the laws
passed in pursuance of it have any force in the foreign territory unless in respect
of our own-citizens (see American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,
356) and operations of the nation in such territory must be governed by treaties,
international understandings and compacts, and the principles of international
law. As a member of the family of nations, the right and power of the United
States in the field are equal to the right and power of the other members of the
international family.
299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (emphasis added).
' See notes 220-21 supra. All these commentators cite dictum to the effect "[t]hat the
Constitution does not apply to foreign countries or to trials conducted therein .. " 183 U.S.
at 270. That is no longer good law. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion and
concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
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very root of the power of Congress to act at all, irrespective of
time or place, and such as are operative only "throughout the
United States" or among the several States.
Thus, when the Constitution declares that "no bill of attainder
or ex post facto law shall be passed," and that "no title or nobili-
ty shall be granted by the United States," it goes to the com-
petency of Congress to pass a bill of that description. Perhaps,
the same remark may apply to the First Amendment, that "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to
peacefully assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances." We do not wish, however, to be
understood as expressing an opinion how far the bill of rights
contained in the first eight amendments is of general and how
far of local application."2
Later in its opinion, the Court returned to the same theme,
remarking:
We suggest, without intending to decide, that there may be a
distinction between certain natural rights, enforced in the Con-
stitution by prohibitions against interference with them, and
what may be termed artificial or remedial rights, which are
peculiar to our own system of jurisprudence. Of the former class
are the rights to one's own religious opinion and to a public ex-
pression of them, or as sometimes said, to worship God accord-
ing to the dictates of one's own conscience; the right to personal
liberty and individual property; to freedom of speech and of the
press; to free access to courts of justice, to due process of law
and to an equal protection of the laws; to immunities from
unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as cruel and unusual
punishments; and to such other immunities as are indispensable
to a free government. Of the latter class are the rights to
citizenship, to sufferage, and to the particular methods of pro-
cedure pointed out in the Constitution, which are peculiar to
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, and some of which have already
been held by individuals.
Whatever may be finally decided by the American people as
to the status of these islands and their inhabitants-whether
they shall be introduced into the sisterhood of States or be per-
mitted to form independent governments-it does not follow
that, in the meantime, awaiting that decision, the people are in
the matter of personal rights unprotected by the provisions of
182 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added).
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our Constitution, and subject to the merely arbitrary control of
Congress. Even if regarded as aliens, they are entitled under
the principles of the Constitution to be protected in life, liberty
and property. This has been frequently held by this court in
respect to the Chinese even when aliens, not possessed of the
political rights of citizens of the United States.'
It is, however, well established as a general proposition that
aliens do not possess all the constitutional rights of United States
citizens and that the legislative and executive branches, without
running afoul of the Constitution, may make distinctions among
categories of aliens that would be impermissible if applied to
United States citizens.' Enemy aliens engaged in operations
hostile to the United States are the least favored category of
aliens; there is high dictum to the effect that they do not enjoy the
civil rights guarantees of the Constitution.
If the Fifth Amendment confers its rights on all the world ex-
cept Americans engaged in defending it, the same must be true
of the companion civil-rights Amendments, for none of them is
limited by its express terms, territorially or as to persons. Such
a construction would mean that during military occupation ir-
reconcilable enemy elements, guerilla fighters, and
"werewolves" could require the American judiciary to assure
them freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as in the First
Amendment, right to bear arms as in the Second, security
against "unreasonable" searches and seizures as in the Fourth,
as well as in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have
been so significant an innovation in the practice of governments
that, if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to
excite contemporary comment. Not one work can be cited. No
decision of this Court supports such a view. Cf. Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 US 244. None of the learned commentators on our
Constitution has even hinted at it. The practice of every modern
government is opposed to it.
We hold that the Constitution does not confer a right of per-
sonal security or an immunity from military trial and punish-
Id. at 282-83 (emphasis added). In making the point that the first amendment and
similar constitutional provisions may have a greater territorial scope than other portions of
the Constitution, the Downes Court did not raise the question of whether the first amend-
ment might extend to areas which were neither states of the union nor occupied by the
United States- presumably because in 1901 the thought that Congress might enact legisla-
tion valid in foreign countries was beyond the contemplation of the Court.
See Mathew v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1979).
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ment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a
government at war with the United States.2"
On the other hand, aliens of friendly countries, including cor-
porations organized in such states, enjoy the fifth amendment pro-
tection against governmental taking of property without just com-
pensation.' It would appear, in light of the authorities discussed
above, that the case for extending the "natural rights""2 ' of peti-
tion, free speech, and association to friendly alien individuals and
corporations is even stronger than the case with respect to fifth
amendment rights.
With respect to the constitutional rights of United States
citizens in foreign countries, the leading case is Reid v. Covert,232
holding that Congress could not constitutionally provide for trial
by court-martial of overseas military dependents. In Reid, the
plurality opinion of Justice Black, representing the views of Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Brennan, stated:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United
States acts against its citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill
of Rights. The United States is entirely a creature of the Con-
stitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can
only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution. When the government reaches out to punish a
citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and
liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to
be in another land.2
Justice Frankfurter concurred with the plurality on this point.'
Similarly, United States v. Toscanino23 held that constitutional
protections, including that against illegal searches and seizure, ap-
ply to conduct abroad of American officials directed against
United States citizens as well as aliens, although they do not ap-
ply to the independent conduct of foreign officials. Likewise, in
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784-85 (1949). In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Black wrote: "Probably no one would suggest, and certainly I would not, that this nation
either must or should attempt to apply every constitutional provision of the Bill of Rights in
controlling temporarily occupied countries." I& at 796-97.
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 282.
354 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
Id. at 56.
500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
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United States ex rel. Allinson v. New Jersey, 6 the court held
that citizens of the United States may invoke constitutional pro-
tections against extraterritorial conduct by federal or state
governments. In addition, in Williams v. Blount"7 the court ruled
that American citizens located outside the United States have the
same rights to use the mails as do citizens inside the United
States. The court stated that the rule may be the same as to mail
directed into the United States by noncitizens.
B. Extraterritorial Content of the First Amendment
If, as Williams v. Blount indicates, constitutional questions are
raised by an attempt to inhibit aliens from sending communica-
tions into the United States, are constitutional questions also
presented by any attempt on the part of Congress to inhibit aliens
and United States citizens from communicating with foreign
governments?
There seems to be no authority directly on point. In that con-
nection it is interesting, and possibly significant, that the Logan
Act, an eighteenth-century criminal statute broadly forbidding
communications with foreign governments in connection with dis-
putes with the United States, has been the subject of virtually no
enforcement efforts during its two centuries of existence.'
The question, then, is a novel one, but several points are clear.
First, regardless of whether corporations "have" first amendment
418 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 580 (1970).
314 F. Supp. 1356 (D.D.C. 1970).
18 U.S.C. § 953 (1976).
The Logan Act provides:
Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without authority
of the United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any cor-
respondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent
thereof, with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign govern-
ment or of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controver-
sies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
This section shall not abridge the right of a citizen to apply, himself or his
agent, to any foreign government or the agents thereof for redress of any injury
which he may have sustained from such government or any of its agents or sub-
jects.
The statute was criticized for the vagueness of its language in Waldron v. British
Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), in which the court suggested that Congress
should consider tightening its loose language so as to clarify the limited application of the
act to circumstances in which private citizens interfere in the conduct of foreign affairs by
the United States government. Id at 89 n.30. Otherwise constitutional questions would be
presented under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Id. at 89.
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rights,24 recent cases make clear beyond peradventure that first
amendment questions may be implicated by corporate speech.2' 1
Moreover, it is equally clear that, while the first amendment is
especially solicitous of political speech because of the intimate
relationship between free speech and self-government,242 there is
nevertheless underlying the first amendment a separate and dis-
tinct concern with protecting self-expression as an end in itself,24
and this separate. concern with self-expression may extend to cir-
cumstances in which the speaker is a corporation rather than a
natural person.244
Noerr and many other cases dealing with first amendment is-
sues concerning political matters base their analysis upon a con-
sideration of how the values embodied in the first amendment in-
teract with the institutions of free government found in the
United States.24 5 That, of course, is perfectly natural, because in
those cases it is the impact of first amendment values on the
United States institutions that the courts must determine.
Some commentators conclude from these authorities that the
first amendment's concerns are parochial and lack application to
other nations' institutions. ' Such a conclusion appears to be
fallacious. In the first place, the authorities generally refer not to
the unique institutions of the United States but rather to the rela-
tionship between free speech and democratic self-government con-
sidered abstractly.2 ' Moreover, such a conclusion totally ignores
the context in which the Bill of Rights was enacted-a desire to
protect the "inalienable" rights of man referred to in the Declara-
tion of Independence. As Jefferson said in a letter to James
I The Supreme Court has properly indicated that is "the wrong question." First Nat'l v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
241 Id. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), the Court
held that the corporate status of a speaker does not permit a state to confine its speech to
specified issues.
E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); First Nat'l Bank
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978).
The Bellotti analysis suggests that the fact that corporations as such do not "have"
thoughts to express is no more dispositive than the fact that corporations as such do not
vote. The question is whether interference with speech by corporations would interfere
with the values protected by the first amendment.
See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
27 "Truth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of
public affairs is concerned .... For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S., 64, 74-75
(1964).
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Madison urging him to support the adoption of a Bill of Rights:
"[A] Bill of Rights is what the people are entitled to against every
government on earth ....
In short, the idea that the first amendment has no bearing on
any congressional attempt to limit free speech and the right of
petition in foreign countries is contrary to the language of the
first amendment, contrary to its spirit, and unsupported by subse-
quent judicial authorities. Whether Congress may constitutionally
interfere with free speech and freedom to petition in
nondemocratic countries is more problematic. It should be
recognized that free government and tyranny are not the only ex-
tant types of government, but represent instead opposite ends of
a spectrum. Most governments, and particularly those that ex-
hibit any degree of stability, have their own ways of learning
about public opinion and taking it into account. It would be a
mistake for the judiciary to proceed on the basis of a culture-
bound bias that overlooks this continuum and assumes that all
non-Western states are benighted.4 9
Is the first amendment, then, implicated in every communica-
tion between a business entity and a dictator, no matter how op-
pressive? Such a conclusion cannot be justified. The courts cannot
protect free speech if there is no free speech, and they cannot pro-
tect the right to petition if the foreign state recognizes no such
right.
Where the channel of communication is a natural monopoly, the
Supreme Court has recognized that governmental regulation may
be greater than would otherwise be permissible under the Con-
stitution.m More generally, where one speaker "drowns out" all
other voices, there may be instances where regulation is constitu-
tionally permissible to restore the balance and permit a multiplici-
ty of voices to be heard. The Bellotti opinion is suggestive. There
the Court noted:
Appellee advances a number of arguments in support of his
2, Letter of Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787, quoted in A. MASON,
FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE MAKING 319 (1965).
"9 The district court in Occidental said: "The persuasion of Middle Eastern States alleged
in the present case is a far cry from the political process with which Noerr was concerned."
331 F. Supp. at 108. In what respect did he understand it to be "a far cry" from United
States governmental process? What was his source of information? Presumably, he did not
base a constitutional determination solely on the factual allegations of the complaint. Did he
perhaps base his view on judicial notice, and if so, did he have a sound basis for so doing?
I0 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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view that these interests are endangered by corporate participa-
tion in discussion of a referendum issue. They hinge upon the
assumption that such participation would exert an undue in-
fluence on the outcome of a referendum vote, and-in the
end- destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic pro-
cess and the integrity of government. According to appellee,
corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may
drown out other points of view. If appellee's arguments were
supported by record or legislative findings that corporate ad-
vocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic pro-
cesses, thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amend-
ment interests, these arguments would merit our consideration.
But there has been no showing that the relative voice of cor-
porations has been overwhelming or even significant in influenc-
ing referenda in Massachusetts, or that there has been any
threat to the confidence of the citizenry in government.2 51
There may be instances involving communications with foreign
governments that are not functioning parliamentary democracies
where the speaker succeeds in "monopolizing the channels of com-
munications" and "drowning out other voices" and where conse-
quently there is simply no discernible relationship between the
values embodied in the first amendment and the institutions in
question. But the fact that such a situation is possible or even like-
ly in some countries no more justifies blanket holdings concerning
the inapplicability abroad of the first amendment than hypo-
thetical corporate abuses justify a state in enacting blanket pro-
hibitions on corporate speech.
In short, it may be true that there are instances where the first
amendment would constitute no bar to an action under the Sher-
man Act for solicitation of anticompetitive foreign governmental
action. Even in such cases, however, considerations of comity as
well as evidence of prejudice to legitimate private interests and
United States foreign policy indicate that Noerr-Pennington
should be applied extraterritorially.
VII. CONCLUSION
The public policy considerations underlying the domestic Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, which immunizes from antitrust attack legit-
imate forms of solicitation of executive, legislative, or judicial ac-
tion, are by and large applicable to the petitioning of foreign
"1 435 U.S. at 789-90 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also id at 791-92.
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governments. Moreover, there are additional factors in the inter-
national sphere that point toward extraterritorial as well as
domestic application of the doctrine.
Domestically, the solicitation of commercial action by govern-
mental bodies enjoys no Noerr-Pennington protection, nor does
the solicitation of any type of governmental action by means of
bribery, perjury, or similar unethical activities. To the extent that
application of United States antitrust law to communication be-
tween business firms and foreign governments presents issues
different from those arising in a domestic context, such novel fac-
tual patterns are best dealt with by appropriate adaptation of ex-
isting case law exceptions to Noerr-Pennington rather than by a
wholesale refusal to apply the doctrine outside the United States.
If the foreign conduct in question passes muster under California
Motor Transport and other Noerr-Pennington authorities and if it
is lawful under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, then considera-
tions of legislative intent, comity, concern over retaliation, and
protection of the legitimate interests of foreign and multinational
businesses all indicate that the conduct should be protected by
Noerr-Pennington.
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